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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
ELMER HANKS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

CASE
NO. 9190

MARK CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT•s BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff and defendant OiWiled large tracts of uncleared
land in the foofuills of South Utah County for many years
prior to 1958. Defendant in recent years had been dearing
his land by fire and 'bulld~r to grow dry-land ·crops. He
had constructed numerous fire-breaks at the request of the
fire wardens around and criss-erossing his property (Tr. 373
to 379). On October 18, 1958, respondent burned some
brush piles under a valid burning permit, the conditions of
which he fully complied with. The fires were started completely surrounded by firebreaks in the early morning on a
calm day (Tr. 383 to 388; 417 to 418). A small fire was
noticed by respondent late in the afternoon North of Fire-
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break E heading north down Snell Hollow toward appellant's land 100 rods away, whtch fire respondent and his
wife were unable to control because of changeable gusts of
wind (Tr. 389 to 392). When the fire flared in the wind
endangering their lives, they went for help while the fire
was still on "respondent's ground and they got back with
the fire department before the fire crossed over onto the
lands of the appellant. The fire was driven down the slope
by the wind onto appellant's lands and became so intense
that fue fire truck had to leave dragging its hoses (Tr. 392
to 397). The flames were 50 to 60 feet high and ash carried
over half a mile by the strong wind (Tr. 399). The appellant's own expert witnesses-the Fire Wardens-testified
that the pernritted fire was put out of control by unusual,
gusty-type winds that arose in the mid-afternoon and became e!Ven stronger bad winds later in the evening, forcing
the fire downhill onto appellant's land and causing the fire
to remain out of control even with fire-fighting equipment
there (Tr. 185 to 188; 224 to 229). This was corroborated
by respondent's witnesses and by respondent (Tr. 363 to
370; 403 to 405; 460 to 461).
After the fire the parties discussed the damage in the
presence of the Fire Chief and respondent claimed the parties· entered into an executory contract whereby respondent was to immediately reseed the range ground of appellant, rebuild fences and replace cedar posts ·with metal
posts, reseed alfalfa damaged by bulldozer and allow appellant free grazing privileges until his own grazing lands were
restored. Respondent did reseed appellant's burned ground
by airplane and bought fence posts but appellant filed this
suit for $23,000.00 damages and denied that any contract
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was made. Even after suit the respondent tendered restoration to the appellant by completion of the alleged executory contract in his Answer but appellant refused to agree
that any such contract existed and came into Court for
money damages only (Tr. 415 to 416; 420 to 425).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS PROCEDURE WITH REGARD 'ro THE INSTRUCTING OF
THE JURY.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE
IS "THE F AlLURE TO USE ORDINARY AND REASONABLE CARE" AND THAT "ORDINARY CARE"
WAS THE MEASURE OF CARE TO BE USED IN THIS
CASE.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT
UNDER A DUTY TO ANTICIPATE AN UNUSUAL WIND
AT THE TIME OF STARTING THE FIRE AND IF AN
UNUSUAL AND UNEXPECTED HIGH WIND AROSE
DURING THlE PROGRESS OF THE FIRE AND CARRIED THE FIRE WHERE IT WOULD NOT HAVE
OTHERWISE SPREAD, SUCH WIND CONSTITUTES
AN INTERVENING CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURY AND THE.DEFENDANT WOULD BE RELIEVED
OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED THEREBY.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AS DRAWN
TO THE JURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS PROCEDURE WITH REGARD TO THE INSTRUCTING OF
THE JURY.
It is most apparent that it is the duty of the Court,
not counsel, to instruct the jury and if the instructions are
proper and correct in a jury trial, the procedure employed
by. the Court as to objections from counsel cannot be prejudicial to a party in the jury verdict. 'f.his is especially
true when there is no objection in the record, as herenot one scintilla, by counsel for the appellant objecting to
the. Court's procedure.
All of the objections in Point I and Point II of Appellant's Brief relate to procedure in requesting proposed instructions and procedure in objecting to proposed instructiOns, all of which matters are improperly raised for the
first time in Appellant's Brief. This appeal, at most, should
turn on only Points III and IV of Appellant's Brief which
relate to alleged faulty instructions. Said Points III and
IV are answered in this Brief in Point II and III hereafter.
At the outset, respondent objects to appellant's version of what happened during the trial as to proposed instructiop.s and objections to instructions. There is nothing
in the record nor in this appeal, like affidavits or written
or s~ted objections, except the bald statements by coun1
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sel for appellant in his Brief as to what happened, and when,
during the trial regarding improper procedure. Counsel
for appellant does not say that he proffered his proposed
instructions some time after the trial had begun and evidence received, as was the case. As oounsel for respondent recall, the trial judge informed both counsel for appellant and for respondent what action was proposed on the
instructions and on the issues of the case for the jury at
least one day before the trial was concluded. The evidence
and proof and the consequent issues were discussed by the
trial judge with all ·counsel prior to the ·cooclusion of the
trial. Counsel for appellant received his copy of the Court's
instructions at the same time that eounsel for respondent
did before the jury was instructed by the Court.
Counsel for appellant argued his case to the jury ~
ing the instructions for the basis thereof, as did ·counsel
for respondent. Respondent and his counsel saw nothing
irregular in the Court's procedure and no objections were
made by them either. Objections should be timely raised
by appellant so that counsel for respondent as well as the
Court have an opportunity to eorreet any errors or pos,.
sible errors. .Appellant and his counsel were anxious and
willing to have the case submitted to the jury, and made
no objections to the Court or opposing ·counsel prior to
the retiring of the jury to consider its verdict. The first
inkling of claimed procedural irregularities appeared after
the trial was over in appellant's Motion for New Trial.
Appellant's Brief in Point II continually repeats that
counsel for appellant "had no opportunity to make objections" or ''was not permitted" to do this or that. The record shows no such thing. The Court does not request ob-
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jecUo!llS. The record shows courise~ for appellant had opportunity and did object often to items of evidence as they
were given but he failed or made no attempt to speak up
at any time about the conduct of .the case ·and he never
informed the Court during the trial of his disapproval of
or his objections ·to the proceedings - not even when he
took his objections to the instructions following the arguments to the jury (Tr. 467 to 470). However, respondent's oounsel had time and opportunity (Tr. 467) to renew
a motion for directed verdict to the Court prior to the instruction of the jury! The appellant had the same opportunity to speak as did respondent, but failed to do so or
chose nort to do so, and therefore has waived any objections. Obvioosly, appellant's objection now to the procedure of the Court is an afterthought to an adverse jury ver-

dict.
AppeUant's counsel would have the Supreme Court believe he was. ignorant of the issues and evidence of the case
until after the trial had been had. Lengthy depositions
of.the parties were taken by counsel on December 9, 1958,
by N·otice from appellant's counsel. A pretrial conference
was held April 3, 1959, with all parties and counsel present
wherein the facts and law were discussed and a Pretrial
Order made by the Court.
Appellant's ·counsel is norw ·standing for the proposition that it is imprope'r to require proposed ins:tructioos tp
the jury until after all evidence is presented. The case
of State Bank vs. Hollingshead, 82 U. 416, 25 P. 2nd 612,
cited ·by appellant, holds· that an instruction must be supported by evidence so that an instruction based on testi.mooy not in the record is erroneous.. But, appellant's pro-
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posed corollary that instructions cannot be formulated or
proposed, until all the evidence is taken, is false and contrary to Rule 51, U. C. A. 1953. Rule 51 also pvovides only
a privilege that counsel may submit requested instructions.
The rule puts the requirement on counsel to make objections to the instructions before the jury retires to ·consider
its verdict. The Court in this case gave the instructions
to the jury before arguments of ~counsel. Appellant has
waived any alleged irregularities in procedure by failing
to object thereto at the time.
Rule 46, U. C. A. 1953, requires a party to make known
to the Court the action which he desires the Court to take
or his objection thereto and his grounds thereTor. 'Uhis the
appellant and his counsel did not attempt to do. Rule 46
does provide that failure to object is not prejudicial if a
party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at
the time it is made. In this case, however, appellant is not
objecting to any ruling or order made by the Court!
Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 5, pages 1903-4, COJVering said Rule 46, makes dear. that a party must make it
clear to the Court that he objects to the Courl's action and
to state his grounds therefor in order to allow the Court
to obviate
defect if possible; also, that a point not raised
and preserved below will not be considered on appeal unless it is a "fundamental error" like allowing interest on
a ·Claim in a Federal case contrary to applicabJe state law.
At page 2503, and thereafter, of VIoL 5 of Moore's Federal
Practice, covering Rule 51, most of the problems raised by
appellant on procedure are answered. The party must object distinctly and with particularity to allow the trial judge
to understand the party's position and to correct possible

the
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errors; also, a general objection to a charge raises no issue
and a party must particularize grounds of objection to preserve the right of appeal.
Rule 61, U. C. A. 1953, specifically declares that minor
defects in the procedural acts or omissions of a court are
hannless error. Respondents assert that there was no error in the procedure of this case, but that even if appellant's claims are true that it would have made no difference
in the outcome of the case by the jury decision. Said Rule
61 is as foilOIWS:
''No error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or

order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard and error
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCfING THE JURY TH1AT NEGLIGENCE IN TillS CASE
IS "THE FAILURE TO USE ORDINARY AND REASONABLE CARE'' AND THAT ''ORDINARY CARE''
WAS THE MEASURE OF CARE TO BE USED IN THIS
CASE.
An analysis of appellant's Brief and even the objections
to the jury instructions discloses that the only two matters being considered on appeal are the standard of care
for negligence (appellant's Point III) and the intervening
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cause of the wind (appellant's Point IV). The only petinent objections by the appellant (Tr. 467 to 470) are insufficient general objections that the instructions do nm
represent the evidence or law. This is improper objecting.
Ex:ceptrions to jury instructions ,must be spedfic and to particular language or a portion thereof or to how it injuriously affects the rights of the party complaining. People
vs. Berlin, 10 U. 39, 36 P. 199; Ryan vs. Beaver County,
82 U. 27, 21 P. 2nd 858, 89 A. L. R. 125.3; Marks vs. Tompkins, 7 U. 421, 27 P. 6. An objection to an instruction which
states that "on the ground and for the reasons that such
instruction is not supported by, and is contrary to, the law
and the evidence" does not comply with the requirements
of (Rule 51). Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Co.
vs. Allen Oil Co., 123 U. 253, 258 P 2nd 445, 450.
On the merits of using the ordinary care standard of
negligence by the Court in its instructio!IlS, it is obvious that
the Court did not err in setting the standard of ordinary
care, because this is the law. The case of Bushnell vs. Telluride Power Co., 145 Federal 2nd 950, cited by appellant
is truly the leading case and it sets ordinary care as the
standard in a fire damage case. It was a Utah case where
defendant was held negligent per se for starting a fire on
restricted lands (spread by a subsequent wind) without
first obtaining a fire permit contrary (the same as at present) to the laws of Utah. However, the standard of care
announced was that of ordinary care, citing Kendall vs.
Fordham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P. 2nd 183. In the case at bar
respondent Christensen had a valid fire permit (See Exhibit) and conformed to the requirements thereof: 1.
Calm· day (Tr. 224) 2. Cat standby (Tr. 402, 417) 3.
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Notify fire departments (Tr. 418). There was no evidence
to the -contrary.
The Court should also note that appellant's own requested instructions, especially No. 10, ask for the ordinary care standard. The appellant would now ask this
Court to find defendant-respondent negligent as a matter
of law and complains that the lower court did not so instruct the jury! At best, it was a jury question if a conflict in the evidence existed, but the appellant did not even
-carry the burden of proof necessary to prove negligence
under the cireumstances. 24 ALR 2nd 254 to 259. Negligence cannot be presumed in a fire case where damage
results. Kendall vs. Fordham, supra Instruction No. 4
given by the Court defines negligence as the failure to do
what an ordinary and reasonable person would have done
under the circumstances. This is what the appellant's
asked for! The items stated on Page 13 of appellant's Brief
were contradicted in the evidence, were considered by the
jury, but WeTe not the proximate cause of the damage.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT
UNDER A DUTY TO ANTICIPATE AN UNUSUAL WIND
AT THE TIME OF STARTING THE FIRE AND IF AN
UNUSUAL AND UNEXPECTED HIGH WIND AROSE
DURING TH!E PROGRESS OF THE FIRE AND CARRIED THE FIRE WHERE IT WOULD NOT HAVE
OTHERWISE SPREAD, SUCH WIND CONSTITUTES
AN INTERVENING CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S IN-
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JURY AND THE DEFENDANT WOULD BE RELIEVED
OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED THEREBY.

The instrUction on the wind as an intervening cause
was taken ahnost verbatim from 22 Am. Jur. 624, Sec. 46
on F•lres. See also 45 ALR 877, 24 ALR 2nd 271. This
is the law and was supported by the evidence in this case.
Appellant's own expert witnesses, the Fire Wardens, on
crciss-exam:ination both gave their conclusive opinions that
the cause otf the fire getting out orf control wa:s the unusual,
gusty-ltype, strong, stiff, erratic Winds that unexpectedly
arose in mid-afternoon while the fire was still well within
respondent's lands (Tr. 185 to 188, 224, 227 to 229).
Instruction No. 12 by the Court about an ~terve:ning
wind is the law as applied to this ~case. It is fully in aceord
with Bushnell vs. TellUride Power Co., supra, because this
is not a case of statutory negligence per se as in the BuShnell case. The appellant would have this Cburt presume
negligence on the defendant under this point as well. It
should be noted, however, that the jury found specifically
in the verdict that the defendant-respondent was not negligent in setting out the fires or tending the same, whereas
said instruction No. 12 merely states that the defendant
would be relieved of damages by a fire spread by ari intervening cause of wind.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AS DRAWN
TO THE JURY.
The appellant did not except- to the special interroga-tories in the verdict, either, and was perfectly willing at
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the time that the case be committed to the jury under said
instructions and said special verdict. It is interesting to
note that the only objection made to the verdict as drawn,
except the usual general objection made by appellant, was
on the question as to whether there was a contract as alleged by the defendant to restore the plaintiff's property
(Tr. 46:7 to 470). If that question were answeTed by the
jury affirmatively, it put the plaintiff out m court as he
denied any such contract which supplanted his claim for
money damages. This was a proper and correct procedure by the Court. However, the jury found no contract,
even though it had been partially perfiormed by defendantrespondent, but the jury found instead on the other questions that the defendant was not negligent in either setting
out the fires or in managing, controlling or tending the
fires. The plaintiff just failed to prove negligence on the
defendant. The plaintiff-appellant has not proved nor
shown where the instructions were erroneous as to his case,
eitheT.
It was a long, expensive trial with much ·as stake for
the defendant-respondent. Appellant unnecessarily ordered
a 475 page transcript and referred to only a very few portions of it, as may be seen in his Brief, to further burden
financially the respondent. The judgment on the verdict
should be affirmed with costs to the respondent to avoid
further litigation and expense.
Respectfully submitted,
MORGAN AND PAYNE,
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent,
Mark Christensen
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